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Retail chains and imports of consumer goods from developing countries have
grown sharply over the past 25 years. Wal-Mart’s sales, which currently account
for 15% of U.S. imports of consumer goods from China, grew 90-fold over this
period, while U.S. imports from China increased 30-fold. We relate these trends
using a model in which scale economies in retail interact with scale economies
in the import process. Combined, these scale economies amplify the eﬀects of
technological change and trade liberalization, creating a two-way relationship
between the chain’s size and its sourcing choice. Falling trade barriers increase
imports not only through direct reduction of input costs but also through an
expanded chain and higher investment in technology. Calculations based on our
model suggest that the existence of the chain more than doubles the sensitivity of
imports to tariﬀ reductions. Technological innovations account for approximately
60% of Wal-Mart’s growth from 1984–2004 and reductions in input cost, due to
tariﬀ reductions and changes in sourcing, account for 40% of this growth.
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In this paper, we study the relationship between the structure of retail markets in the U.S.
and the volume and source of consumer-goods imports. The most striking change in retail
markets over the past 25 years has been an increase in the size and prevalence of “big box”
chains, most spectacularly among them Wal-Mart, which has experienced a ten-fold growth
in the number of stores. Imports from developing countries have also increased dramatically
over this period; China’s imports to the U.S. expanded 30-fold in real terms. Wal-Mart’s
imports have increased even faster: while the chain now handles 6.5% of U.S. retail sales, it
accounts for over 15% of U.S. imports of consumer goods from China. We present a theory
that links these trends and show that there is a two-way relationship between the size of
a dominant retailer and imports of consumer goods. The model can explain a number of
observed patterns, including the concurrent and accelerating expansion of Wal-Mart and
U.S. imports from China despite only modest reductions in trade barriers and the collapse
of Wal-Mart’s “Buy American” campaign in the early 1990s.
We focus on Wal-Mart because it has become the canonical example of a large retail
chain and because the claim has been made repeatedly in the popular press that Wal-Mart
imports more than other retailers and that its purchasing decisions have inﬂuenced trade pat-
terns. A 2003 Pulitzer Prize-winning series on Wal-Mart in the Los Angeles Times claimed
that “Wal-Mart is so powerful that it moves the economies of entire countries, bringing proﬁt
and pain,” and, more speciﬁcally, that Wal-Mart “has hastened the ﬂight of U.S. manufac-
turing jobs overseas” (Goldman and Cleeland, 2003). A 2004 PBS documentary focused on
the “clash between the interests of Americans as workers and the desires of Americans as
consumers” inherent in Wal-Mart’s “everyday low prices.”1 Less ominously, the Economist
argues that “the emergence of China as a centre of low-cost production is playing to [Wal-
Mart’s] strengths” (The Economist, 2004). These arguments are consistent with Bernard,
1See http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/walmart/etc/synopsis.html.Jensen, and Schott’s (forthcoming) ﬁnding, using the Longitudinal Business Database and
detailed ﬁrm-level data on trade transactions, that larger ﬁrms are disproportionately en-
gaged in trade: they import (and export) more products, from more countries, and at much
higher rates per worker than smaller ﬁrms.
In our model, the relationship between chain size and imports emerges from an inter-
action between economies of scale in retailing and economies of scale in the import process.
We focus on a chain retailer with a ﬁxed (later, endogenous) “chaining” technology that de-
termines its cost of logistics and distribution. The chain has economies of scale in marketing,
which we model as a declining marginal cost. A second source of economies of scale arises
because there are two input markets, one domestic and one foreign, and there is a ﬁxed cost
associated with purchasing the input from the foreign market. As a result, the chain needs
to reach a threshold size before it begins to import. These factors combine to generate an
equilibrium that depends on the chain’s technology. Technological improvements increase
the chain’s optimal size, reducing its marginal input cost; the lower retail price that results
increases quantity demanded in each of the chain’s stores. When the chain becomes suﬃ-
ciently large it switches from domestic to oﬀshore suppliers. The movement of production
overseas further reduces marginal cost, increasing the chain’s proﬁt per store and giving it
an added incentive to expand.
The expansion of the chain increases market size and, at the same time, feeds on this
larger market. The idea that market size aﬀects production patterns, which dates back to
Adam Smith (1776), has been studied extensively in the trade literature.2 We build on it
using a model similar to Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) in which production is described as
a set of blocks linked to form a supply chain. Outsourcing a production block entails a ﬁxed
linking cost, so the size of the market determines the extent of outsourcing.3,4 In our model,
2See for example Helpman and Krugman (1985), Ethier (1979), and Belassa (1967).
3See also Wan (2005) and Long, Riezman, and Souberyan (2005) for models extending this idea.
4To focus on the main issues of this paper we ignore the distinctions among the diﬀerent forms these
links can assume, i.e., whether the foreign producer is a subsidiary, subcontractor, or independent exporter,
2the extent of outsourcing also aﬀects the size of the market, operating through the chain
store.
The relationship between these two scale economies ampliﬁes the eﬀect of trade liberal-
ization on import volume. A lower tariﬀ not only expands imports through the usual eﬀect
on price but also causes the retailer to expand the chain. The expanded chain brings imports
to more locations and reduces the retailer’s marginal cost, causing a further expansion of
the market for imports. Accounting for these additional eﬀects due to the chain’s expansion
more than doubles the eﬀective elasticity of demand for imports relative to standard models
that only consider the direct eﬀect of a tariﬀ reduction.
The retail chain’s costs add an endogenous layer to the gap between manufacturers’
production costs and consumer prices. In neoclassical international trade models this gap is
due solely to frictions such as tariﬀs and transport costs. Trade models with monopolistic
competition increase the gap by adding the monopolist’s markup. We introduce the retail
chain’s cost which further increases the wedge between production costs and consumer prices.
Because economies of scale cause the retail chain to expand as tariﬀs fall, this added wedge
shrinks endogenously, amplifying the eﬀect of a tariﬀ reduction. The shrinking wedge can
help explain the observed nonlinear relationship between tariﬀ reductions and trade volume
noted by, among others, Yi (2003), Romalis (2005), and Ruhl (2008). In the case of China,
a large tariﬀ reduction with the granting of Most Favored Nation status in 1980 had a
relatively small eﬀect on exports to the U.S., while modest tariﬀ reductions in later years
have generated much larger increases in exports.
A related point is that, because trade liberalization increases the retailer’s incentive to
expand, it leads to increased downstream concentration. This result is new to the literature
and complements the result of recent models by Alessandria and Choi (2007), Melitz (2003),
etc. Several recent papers have examined these contractual arrangements in detail (see Antr` as, 2003; Antr` as
and Helpman, 2004; Grossman and Helpman, 2002a,b). Of particular interest for our context are Feenstra
and Hanson’s (2005) study of outsourcing in China and Javorcik, Keller, and Tybout’s (2006) paper on the
eﬀect of Wal-Mart’s Mexican operations on the that country’s soap and detergent industry.
3and Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2006), all of which ﬁnd eﬀects of productivity shocks and
trade liberalization on exporting ﬁrms. The only other paper we are aware of that connects
retail activity and trade barriers is by Campbell and Lapham (2004), who empirically eval-
uate the eﬀect of U.S.-Canada exchange rate ﬂuctuations on cross-border retail shopping.
Our setting allows for exchange rate and other input cost ﬂuctuations to aﬀect a much wider
swath of consumers because the chain, as importer, brings goods to all its stores.
For our purposes, China serves both as an embodiment of a more general phenomenon
and as a special case. To a large extent, our model applies to Vietnam, Bangladesh, and
Taiwan as much as it applies to China. But an extension of our model in which we allow for
a continuum of possible production locations reveals a sense in which China is diﬀerent. If
the retailer’s technology improves (for either exogenous or endogenous reasons), it contracts
with producers in ever-farther locations, increasingly taking advantage of lower production
costs. This is perhaps most relevant to the rise of Wal-Mart because Wal-Mart specializes in
relatively low-end products whose production does not require large investments in human
and physical capital. China is the current locus of this process. This interpretation is
consistent with the sentiment of some developing economies that industries are being lost
to China (see, for instance, Moreira, 2007) over a period when U.S. import tariﬀ rates
have declined at similar rates for all countries. As production moves across countries and
regions, the chain takes advantage of falling costs by growing even more, further magnifying
the chain’s eﬀect on import volume. As a result, trade liberalization that aﬀects all an
importing country’s (current and potential) trading partners equally can cause production
to shift from one country to another. In other words, greater potential access to an export
market can reduce a country’s exports if the same measure also increases competition from
other countries.
Although we emphasize the role of the retailer as a direct importer, this is obviously only
part of the story. Many imports arrive on retailers’ shelves via intermediaries: wholesalers,
merchandisers, or manufacturers. (Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (forthcoming) ﬁnd that re-
4tailers and wholesalers make up a large and increasing share of importing ﬁrms, but they do
not distinguish between the two sectors.) A ﬁnal extension embeds our model in a frame-
work in which the chain retailer can choose to import directly or through an intermediary.
Because importing directly involves duplicating the intermediary’s costs, if the intermediary
can charge the chain and smaller retailers diﬀerent prices, the solution with indirect im-
ports always dominates. Indirect importing creates an additional price wedge due to double
marginalization: both the intermediary and the retailer charge a markup over marginal cost.
Like the retailer’s markup, we ﬁnd that the intermediary’s markup is endogenous and falls
with tariﬀs. Thus, we obtain the same qualitative results as for the direct-import case: a
reduction in tariﬀs is ampliﬁed by a shrinking markup.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some facts
about the recent growth of chains and imports that serve as background to our model.
Section 3 describes the basic model and analyzes the eﬀects of technological change and
trade liberalization, along with extensions. Section 4 presents a numerical exercise that
quantiﬁes the contributions of scale economies, lower input costs, and better technology on
the size of the retail chain and on import volumes. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background: Chains and Imports
Retail chains have grown dramatically over the past half-century, while stand-alone (“mom-
and-pop”) retailers have been declining. A recent study using establishment-level data from
the Census Bureau covering the period 1975–2000 shows that retail chains were the driving
force behind the growth in the number of retail stores and the sole source of growth in retail
employment over this period. Among retail chains, national chains grew the fastest (Jarmin,
Klimek, and Miranda, 2005).
Table 1 shows the increase in the size and dominance of chains over the period 1948–
2002. In the ﬁrst three columns we report, respectively, the fraction of retail ﬁrms that
5operate chains, the share of all retail stores that belong to chains, and chains’ share of all
retail sales. All three measures rise over time, with a distinct rise in the share of chain stores
since the early 1970s. In the last three columns we report the same three measures but for
large chains (with 100 or more stores) relative to all chains; large chains have been gaining
market share relative to smaller chains throughout this period.
These trends may be explained by advances in technology that increasingly raise chains’
cost advantage over stand-alone retailers. Although available measures of productivity and
eﬃciency for the retail industry are relatively poor, chains appear to be more productive than
stand-alone retailers and they invest more in information technology (Doms, Jarmin, and
Klimek, 2004). Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2002) show that the bulk of productivity
growth in the U.S. retail sector in the 1990s came from the expansion of more-productive
retail chains and the contraction and exit of less-productive retailers, and that the retail
sector exhibits large and persistent productivity diﬀerences across establishments within
narrow (4-digit) industries.
There is evidence that bigger retail ﬁrms tend to import more. Bernard, Jensen, and
Schott (forthcoming) ﬁnd that the size distribution of importing ﬁrms is much more skewed
than the overall size distribution of ﬁrms; the largest ﬁrms import disproportionately more
than their size would suggest. In a study across retail sectors, Basker and Van (2008) ﬁnd
that the largest retail chains are substantially more likely than smaller retailers to import
from less-developed countries (LDCs). For example, the largest chains across all retail sectors
increase imports by 10 cents for every dollar increase in sales whereas the smaller retailers
increase imports an average of less than 3 cents per dollar of sales.
Wal-Mart is the largest retail chain in the United States (and the world). The chain
has expanded steadily since opening its ﬁrst store in Rogers, Arkansas, in 1962; by 2004, it
had more than 3,000 stores in all 50 states and about 800,000 employees in the U.S. and
accounted for 6.5% of all U.S. retail sales. Figure 1 shows U.S. Wal-Mart sales in real 2002
6dollars over the period 1978–2004 as a thick line (using the right-hand axis).5 Figure 2
separates Wal-Mart’s sales growth since 1985 into two components: the rise in the number
of Wal-Mart stores (solid line, left axis) and sales per store (dotted line, right axis). Since
part of the growth in sales per store has been fueled by the rise of the “Supercenter” format
which includes a full line of groceries, we also compute sales per store excluding grocery
sales. All of these rise over time.6
Wal-Mart’s technological prowess, its zealous cost-cutting, and its propensity to import
have all received much attention in popular discourse. Feiner, O’Andraia, Black, Jones,
and Konik (2002) cite Wal-Mart’s “use of technology for merchandising, distribution and
replenishment” as its main advantage over other retailers (p. 217). A study by McKinsey
Global Institute (2001) attributes much of the acceleration in productivity growth in the
1990s to Wal-Mart, and Holmes (2001) and Bagwell, Ramey, and Spulber (1997) also cite
evidence that Wal-Mart is a leading investor in IT. In 1990, Wal-Mart introduced a tech-
nological innovation, Retail Link, software connecting its stores, distribution centers, and
suppliers, providing detailed inventory data “to bring our suppliers closer to our individual
stores” (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1991, p. 3). Many industry observers credit Wal-Mart’s
subsequent dominance in the retail sector to this innovation (see, for example, Abernathy,
Dunlop, Hammond, and Weil, 1999).
In 1985, Wal-Mart launched a popular and well-publicized “Buy American” campaign,
pledging to “buy American whenever we can” and to pay up to a 5% premium for U.S.-
made goods (Zellner, 1992). In late 1992, however, Dateline NBC aired a segment charging
Wal-Mart with producing private-label clothes in Bangladesh, smuggling Chinese garments
into the U.S. in excess of U.S. quotas, and placing imported clothes on racks marked “Made
5Includes Sam’s Club sales.
6The share of sales due to groceries has been reported since 1997 in Wal-Mart’s 10-K ﬁlings; pre-1997
ﬁgures are imputed. Groceries are just the latest product line to be added by Wal-Mart, after pharmaceuti-
cals, auto services, and others. See Basker, Klimek, and Van (2008) for details. For a general discussion of
Wal-Mart’s advantages and economic impact, see Basker (2007).
7in the USA” (Gladstone, 1992).7 References to the “Buy American” campaign disappeared
from both the popular press and Wal-Mart’s publications by early 1993.8 In the context of
our model, Wal-Mart’s abandonment of its “Buy American” campaign can be attributed to
its expansion over the course of the campaign from 859 to 1880 stores, possibly passing a
threshold size beyond which purchasing inputs domestically was no longer proﬁt maximizing.
Concurrent with Wal-Mart’s expansion, U.S. imports from the rest of the world, and
from less-developed countries (LDCs) in particular, have surged. Between 1984 and 2004,
U.S. imports from China increased more than 30-fold in real terms. Imports from China
are shown in Figure 1 as a thin solid line, using the right-hand axis, on the same scale
as U.S. Wal-Mart sales.9 The emergence of private label apparel that competes directly
with U.S. apparel manufacturing and global sourcing of apparel production also coincided
with these trends (Gereﬃ, 1999). This rise in imports has occurred while import tariﬀs on
Chinese goods have fallen only modestly. The only sharp decline occurred in 1980, when
China was granted Most Favored Nation (now Normal Trade Relations, or NTR) status with
the U.S.; since then, tariﬀs on Chinese goods have fallen gradually, as part of the general
reduction in NTR rates. The dotted line in Figure 1 shows, using the left-hand axis, the
average (unweighted) U.S. tariﬀ rate applicable to products exported from China for the
period 1978–2000.10,11
7Gereﬃ and Pan (1994) rank Wal-Mart as the second-largest retail buyer in Taiwan that same year.
8Wal-Mart referred to its “Buy American” campaign as “a key philosophy of our buying divisions” in its
1987 annual report (p. 8) and reiterated its commitment to “‘Buy American’ in every possible situation”
in the 1989 annual report (p. 2). By 1994, the annual report stated (p. 6), “We wish that everything we
sell was made in the United States. Today this isn’t possible, but we are going to keep trying” (Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., various years).
9This ﬁgure uses the ﬁnished-goods Producer Price Index to deﬂate nominal import values from the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis. The true growth rate is probably even larger, because the composition of
imports from China is skewed towards items, like apparel and toys, whose prices have been falling relative
to the overall price level. Wal-Mart’s sales ﬁgures include sales from its Sam’s Club division.
10We thank John Romalis for providing these data from Romalis (2005). Figures for 2001–2004 are not
available but do not include any sharp breaks.
11The increase in imports from China reﬂects increases in imports of intermediate goods and capital goods
in addition to consumer goods. While our story applies directly only to consumer goods, the mechanism we
describe, which operates through economies of scale and increased market size, may apply more broadly. If
8Many observers have speculated on a link between these concurrent trends in the retail
and import sectors. Early on, Wal-Mart was one of a handful of retailers and merchandising
ﬁrms that constituted the primary link between Asian manufacturers and the American mar-
ket. The role of big retailers in “organizing and channeling,” if not amplifying, demand for
cheap imports has been noted by Petrovic and Hamilton (2005) and Feenstra and Hamilton
(2006); Gereﬃ (1999) argues that the growth of “high volume, low cost discount chains,”
including Wal-Mart, has ampliﬁed global sourcing (pp. 44–45). Wal-Mart’s import volume
is not publicly available, but some ﬁgures have been cited in the popular press. Wal-Mart ac-
counted for approximately $18 billion in goods imports from China in 2004, representing over
15% of U.S. consumer-goods imports from China that year; about half of this amount refers
to direct imports, the rest coming through its suppliers (The Economist, 2004). Wal-Mart’s
sales account for 6.5% of U.S. retail sales (Basker, 2007), so this ﬁgure implies Wal-Mart
imports from China at over twice the rate of the retail sector as a whole. Others estimate
that 80% of Wal-Mart’s global suppliers are located in China (Goodman and Pan, 2004) and
that 70% of its products are made in China (Jiang, 2004).12 Gereﬃ (2006) estimates that
Wal-Mart, the top U.S. apparel seller, sources 100% of its apparel from low-cost countries
and also sells a much higher share of private-label apparel than other national apparel sellers
(80% vs. an average of 35% among the top-ten apparel retailers).
A look at the relationship between apparel price inﬂation and Wal-Mart’s market share
also suggests that Wal-Mart imports disproportionately more than other apparel sellers.
Using annual data on consumer price inﬂation in the apparel sector for 23 metropolitan areas
(∆pit, with i indexing the location and t indexing year), import price inﬂation for apparel at
the national level (∆pm
t ), and Wal-Mart’s market share (WMshareit) over a 19-year period,
there are increasing returns to scale in manufacturing, then declines in the cost of intermediary goods can
be ampliﬁed in that sector too through a similar mechanism to the one described in this paper.
12This last ﬁgure is almost certainly exaggerated.
9we estimate a pass-through equation,
∆pit = β1 + β2∆p
m
t + β3WMshareit + β4∆p
m
t · WMshareit + εit. (1)
The results are shown in Table 2 for two diﬀerent measures of import price inﬂation.13 For
each measure, we report in the ﬁrst column results from a regression with no covariates, where
we ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the two inﬂation rates:
a 1-point increase in apparel import price inﬂation corresponds to a 0.4-0.5 point increase
in apparel consumer price inﬂation. In the second column, we add Wal-Mart’s market
share and the interaction term. The direct eﬀect of Wal-Mart is to reduce apparel inﬂation,
consistent with the common perception that Wal-Mart’s presence serves as a discipline device
for costs.14 The coeﬃcient on the interaction term is positive: increasing Wal-Mart’s market
share from 1% to 2% — an increase of 10 stores, on average — nearly doubles the sensitivity
of consumer price inﬂation to import price inﬂation. Such an eﬀect implies that the import
share of apparel sales at Wal-Mart stores is substantially higher than at the average apparel
retailer.15
These results are not deﬁnitive, but they are strongly suggestive that Wal-Mart’s pres-
ence is associated with a higher level of imports in an MSA, and they are consistent with the
common perception that Wal-Mart acts as a catalyst to greater imports and increased global
sourcing. In the next section, we suggest a mechanism that can explain this relationship.
13The data are described in full in Appendix B.
14As noted by Hausman and Leibtag (2004), the BLS’s correction for sampling changes biases the indices
against exhibiting a “Wal-Mart eﬀect.”
15Wal-Mart’s market share is measured with error, since the number of stores in the denominator is not
weighted by their sales share, and we do not control for the existence of other large chain retailers which
may also import disproportionately to their size. Because these problems bias us against ﬁnding an eﬀect,
however, the estimated eﬀect is probably a lower bound on the eﬀect of large chains on apparel imports.
103 Model
3.1 Domestic Production
There are N locations or retail markets (N large), which are ex ante identical. Each location
is served by a monopolist retailer selling a single consumption good. Market demand in each
location, x(p), is downward-sloping.
We focus on the partial-equilibrium choices of a single retailer. The retailer has access
to “chaining technology” that enables it to operate a chain of k ≥ 0 stores at a cost
c(k)
δ ,
where δ > 0 and c(·) is increasing and convex.16 We think of c(k) as capturing the costs
of adding truck routes, distribution center inventory, etc. The motivation for a positive
second derivative on c(·) is that each additional store is accommodated by re-optimizing
distribution facilities, inventory management and trucking routes, and this process becomes
increasingly complex — and costly — as the network expands. Westerman (2001), for
example, discusses the complications for Wal-Mart’s replenishment system caused by “the
growth of the company ...[into] diﬀerent time zones” (page 182).17 In addition, without
convex chaining costs, nothing would keep the chain from expanding to take over all retail
locations; this scenario is both unrealistic and uninteresting from our point of view. The
parameter δ captures the chain’s level of technology: if δ is very high, then the cost of
chaining is very low. We begin by treating δ as exogenous; we later endogenize it to capture
the retailer’s investment decision.
The retailer’s role is to buy the consumption good from a manufacturer and sell it to
consumers. The retailer’s cost consists of two elements: the input cost of the consumption
good and a marketing cost. The consumption good is produced by a competitive market
16Formally, c(0) = c0(0) = 0, c0 > 0 for k > 0, c00 > 0.
17Holmes (2008) explicitly models the expansion pattern of Wal-Mart, with a focus on “economies of
density” — the cost-savings achieved when stores are located near one another. We abstract from that issue
here, treating all locations as symmetric with respect to one another.
11using a constant-returns production technology with marginal input cost α.18 The retailer
also incurs a marketing cost to sell the product to consumers. If the retailer has k ≥ 0
stores, each of which sells x ≥ 0 units, total marketing cost is S(kx), where S(·) increasing
but concave.19 Combining the production and marketing components, the total input cost
for a retailer selling kx units is αkx + S(kx). The chain retailer simultaneously chooses its
size (number of stores) and quantity (equivalently, price) in each location. Formally, it solves
max
k,x
π(k,x) = kx(p(x) − α) − S(kx) −
c(k)
δ
subject to k ∈ [0,N]
x ≥ 0
where p(x) is the inverse demand function. The ﬁrst constraint is on chain size, which must
be nonnegative and cannot exceed the total number of locations in the economy.20 The
second constraint is on the number of units sold per store, which cannot be negative.
The combination of economies and diseconomies of scale — declining marketing marginal
cost, but increasing marginal cost of chaining — implies that, for a given value of x, the
average cost per store is U-shaped. The standard results imply that the optimal choice of k
will be on the upward-sloping part of the average cost curve.
18Our analysis would not change if retailing technology involved two or more inputs, used in ﬁxed pro-
portions, if those inputs were supplied by competitive markets. We do, however, abstract from any cost
advantages the chain may have in other inputs. For the types of products that Wal-Mart sells — apparel,
footwear, furniture and ﬁxtures — there is no systematic evidence of increasing returns to scale in production
(Antweiler and Treﬂer, 2002).
19Formally, S(0) = 0, S0 > 0, S00 < 0, and S000 > 0 so that marginal cost is declining in kx, but at a
decreasing rate.
20For the most part, we assume that the upper limit N on k does not bind. This seems reasonable as a
ﬁrst approximation: although Wal-Mart currently has more than 3,000 stores in the U.S. alone, its expansion
plan suggests there is plenty more room for it to grow. Wal-Mart’s plans for 2006 include opening at least
140 new stores (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2005). We also ignore integer problems in the solution k∗.
12Formally, an interior solution (k∗,x∗) must satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions






0(x)x + p(x) − α − S
0(kx)) = 0. (3)
This interior solution dominates the corner solution (k,x) = (0,0) if and only if it yields
a positive proﬁt. We show the second-order conditions for an interior solution and derive
suﬃcient conditions for existence and uniqueness of the solution in Appendix A.
We write the solution to Equation (2) as k∗(x) and the solution to Equation (3) as x∗(k).
Figure 3 shows the determination of x∗(k) at the intersection of the (downward-sloping)
marginal cost and marginal revenue curves. Two marginal cost curves are represented as
thin lines, each for a diﬀerent value of chain size, k. Increasing k rotates the marginal cost
curve clockwise around α + S0(0).
Figure 4 shows, for two diﬀerent values of δ, the simultaneous determination of (k∗(x),x∗(k)).
The curve k∗(x), which depends on δ, is shown as the thick solid line and x∗(k) as the thin
solid line. When δ, the chain’s technology parameter, is small, the cost of operating multiple
stores is high. As δ increases, the curve k∗(x;δ) rotates clockwise, increasing the optimal
value of k. The new equilibrium features a higher k∗ as well as a higher x∗: the chain oper-
ates more stores and sells more units per store (at a lower retail price). We formalize this in
the following result:
Result 1 (Technological Change). The chain’s size, units sold per store, total sales volume
(kx) and sales value (kxp(x)) all increase with δ.
All proofs are in Appendix A.
There is much evidence that Wal-Mart’s chaining technology has improved over time.
In 1969, the company installed a computer in its ﬁrst distribution center; by the late 1970s a
computer network linked all Wal-Mart stores and distribution centers to company headquar-
ters. Bar-code technology was added in all distribution centers by the late 1980s (Feiner,
13O’Andraia, Black, Jones, and Konik, 2002). If δ increases gradually, starting from a low
level, chain size increases with it, and consumer prices fall.
3.2 Foreign Production
We now suppose that the consumption good can be manufactured either domestically or
oﬀshore (and imported) and derive both the conditions under which the chain chooses to
import the good and the consequences of this choice.
Assume for simplicity that there are two possible production locations (domestic and
foreign); we allow for a continuum of possible production locations in Section 3.5. In each
location there is a large number of identical manufacturers with access to a constant-returns
production technology, and pricing is competitive. We now write the domestic manufactur-
ing sector’s competitive price as α0. The foreign manufacturing sector has lower marginal
production cost e α1  α0, but there is a transportation cost (normalized to zero for the
domestically-produced good) and tariﬀ that sum to τ per unit. We deﬁne α1 ≡ e α1 +τ < α0
to be the marginal input cost if the good is produced oﬀshore.
In addition to the production and transportation cost/tariﬀ, the retailer must incur a
ﬁxed cost F > 0 in order to purchase input from a foreign manufacturer. This ﬁxed cost
includes the cost of setting up a production facility or a relationship with a producer in a
foreign country, or a network of buyers such as the one that Wal-Mart has in China, and
possibly any non-pecuniary costs such as backlash from domestic residents.21 For now, we
assume that the retailer, not the manufacturer, bears the cost F; we allow for the possibility
that an intermediary pays the cost in Section 3.6. As mentioned earlier, approximately 50%
of Wal-Mart’s imports are direct imports through its contracts with foreign manufacturers.
21Swenson (2005) oﬀers evidence from the U.S. Oﬀshore Assembly Program (OAP) suggesting that the
pattern OAP outsourcing is consistent with the presence of a ﬁxed cost, which she attributes to search and
product development.
14In these cases, it seems reasonable to assume that Wal-Mart bears any ﬁxed cost.22
To capture the retailer’s additional choice we introduce the variable θ ∈ {0,1}, which
equals 0 if the input is purchased from domestic producers and 1 if the input is imported.
The chain’s maximization problem becomes
max
k,x,θ




subject to k ∈ [0,N]
x ≥ 0
θ ∈ {0,1}.
Since the choice of θ is discrete, to solve this problem the chain compares its maximized
proﬁt if it purchases the input from domestic suppliers with proﬁt from the alternative
case in which it purchases the input from foreign manufacturers. Letting (k∗
θ,x∗
θ) be the





the choice of θ depends on whether the increase in proﬁt from obtaining a lower-price input
fully oﬀsets the ﬁxed cost of importing F.
The solution is shown graphically in Figure 5. An interior solution (k∗
0,x∗
0) is shown





1) is shown at the intersection of the dashed thick and thin lines.
Because α1 < α0, the chain earns a larger variable proﬁt per store if the input is imported
than if it is purchased domestically, so conditional on θ = 1 (and therefore a sunk cost F), for
any level of sales per store x > 0 the chain chooses a larger chain size k∗(x). The curve x∗(k)
also depends on θ, because the lower marginal cost associated with the imported product
increases the value of x at which marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue.
The following lemma formally establishes that the optimal chain size conditional on
22An estimated 40% of Wal-Mart’s revenue comes from its private label brands (Petrovic and Hamilton,
2005).
15the chain purchasing input from oﬀshore producers is larger than the optimal chain size





0 except when k∗
0 = N.




be the diﬀerence, net of the ﬁxed cost of importing F, between the chain’s proﬁt conditional
on foreign sourcing (with the conditionally-optimal chain size k∗
1 selling the conditionally-
optimal number of units x∗
1 per store) and the chain’s proﬁt conditional on domestic sourcing
(with the conditionally optimal chain having size k∗
0 with sales x∗
0 per store). Because G(·,·)
is the diﬀerence between the conditional optimized proﬁts, net of F, it depends only on the
parameters of the model and not on any decision variables. By the envelope theorem, G > 0;
the optimal input source is θ∗ = 1 if and only if G ≥ F.
3.3 Technological Change and Trade Liberalization
We can now analyze the eﬀect of an improvement in the chain’s technology (a rise in δ)
on imports. We continue to abstract from the technology-investment decision and treat
the technology parameter δ as exogenous. The next result establishes that the decision to
purchase input from oﬀshore producers depends on δ: the chain only imports its input if its
technological advantage is suﬃciently large.
Result 2 (Technological Change). If F is not too high, there exists some δm < ∞ such
that the chain purchases the input domestically when δ < δm and imports the input once its
chaining technology exceeds this level.
Result 2, combined with Result 1, implies that the chain grows with δ and chooses to
import its input if δ is suﬃciently high. Because we have only one good in this model, there
is only one extensive margin, beyond which further increases in δ increase the chain’s total
16sales and, therefore, total imports (on the intensive margin). With a continuum of goods
with diﬀerent parameter values, increases in δ would aﬀect both the intensive and extensive
margins of importing. By Lemma 1, the chain’s size (k and x) increases discretely at δ = δm.
We do not expect to see a discrete increase in the chain’s size in the data, however, both
because with many goods this eﬀect would be muted and because in practice the chain’s
optimal size k∗ is constrained by real-world frictions such as “time to build” (Koeva, 2000).
This result holds only if F is not too large; if the ﬁxed cost F of importing is too high, the
variable-cost savings from importing the input can never be justiﬁed. In that case, δm would
be inﬁnite and the input would be purchased domestically regardless the chain’s technology
level.
Result 2 is consistent with the experience of Wal-Mart in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Between 1985 and 1995, Wal-Mart’s chaining technology improved dramatically with
the introduction of “Retail Link,” an innovative distribution system connecting its stores,
distribution centers, headquarters and suppliers. Wal-Mart more than doubled in size over
this period, transitioning from a regional chain with 745 stores in 20 states to a national chain
with 2,200 stores in 49 states. And, at the same time, Wal-Mart launched, then retreated
from, a massive “Buy American” campaign.
This result is also consistent with the simultaneous increase in U.S. Wal-Mart sales and
U.S. imports from China, shown in Figure 1. Over the period 1984–2004, Wal-Mart’s share
of U.S. retail sales rose from 0.1% to 6.5%; imports from China have grown at an even faster
rate, and prices of clothes, toys and electronics — items increasingly imported from China
and other LDCs — have fallen considerably. Apparel prices, for example, fell 82% relative
to the overall price level between 1984 and 2004 and real toy prices fell 47% over this period.
Like technological change, trade liberalization aﬀects both the extensive and intensive
margins of the chain’s importing decision. To analyze the eﬀect of a reduction in tariﬀs on
k∗ and x∗, we explicitly write the unit input cost of the imported good as e α1 + τ, with e α1
the production cost and τ the combined import tariﬀ and transport cost.
17Result 3 (Trade Liberalization). If F is not too high, there is some τm < ∞ such that:
1. The chain purchases the input domestically when τ > τm and imports the input once
the tariﬀ falls below this level;
2. τm is increasing in δ;
3. For τ ≤ τm, the chain’s size, units sold per store, and total import volume and value
all increase as τ declines.
This result is a consequence of the ﬁxed cost of purchasing the input from oﬀshore pro-
ducers, which creates a threshold market size for oﬀshore production. As the cost advantage
of foreign producers increases (because of a decline in trade costs), the threshold market size
declines. Improvements in the chain’s technology increase its market size and raise the upper
bound on trade barriers that can support trade. Once τ falls below this upper bound (at
which point the chain begins to import and increases discretely in size), any further trade
liberalization also increases the chain’s size.































This decomposition allows us to identify three distinct eﬀects:
1. Demand Eﬀect: ∂x
∂τ
τ
x. This is the “conventional” eﬀect, which works through the
increase in demand at a ﬁxed number of locations due to lower unit cost.
2. Expansion Eﬀect: ∂k
∂τ
τ
k. This eﬀect works through the expansion of the chain. In our
simple model, retailers in locations not served by the chain do not import at all, while
the chain sells imported goods exclusively. More generally, as long as other retailers
sell fewer imports than the chain, the expansion of the chain increases imports. We





















k. As the chain expands, its marginal marketing
cost falls, which further lowers its retail price and increases import, amplifying both
the demand eﬀect and the expansion eﬀect.
All three of these eﬀects work in the same direction. Together, they provide an alterna-
tive explanation for the “tariﬀ elasticity puzzle” of Yi (2003). Yi argues that the response of
trade volumes to tariﬀ reductions over the past two decades implies an implausibly high price
elasticity of demand. Here, the existence and expansion of the chain ampliﬁes the demand
eﬀect. In Section 4, we quantify these eﬀects and show that the demand eﬀect accounts for
approximately 43% of the total eﬀect of a tariﬀ reduction, the scale eﬀect accounts for 32%,
and the remaining 25% is due to the expansion eﬀect.
Because the direct eﬀect of a tariﬀ reduction on prices is ampliﬁed by the expansion
and scale eﬀects, consumer prices fall more than one-for-one with tariﬀ reductions. Put
diﬀerently, the wedge between the production cost and the retail price of a good, which is
partly endogenous, falls as trade barriers are relaxed. Ironically, in our setting this price
reduction occurs as the downstream sector — retailing — becomes more concentrated.
This decomposition also allows us to address what might be termed the “Fogel critique”
to our model. Fogel argues that railroads were not as important as others had claimed,
because canals would have appeared in their absence; one might similarly argue that in the
absence of Wal-Mart (or another retail chain), a wholesaler could have taken advantage of
the same economies of scale.23 But in the context of our model, while a wholesaler would
beneﬁt from the demand eﬀect and the part of the scale eﬀect that is an ampliﬁcation of the
demand eﬀect, the expansion eﬀect — and its ampliﬁcation by economies of scale — would
not be available to a wholesaler. Thus, the retail chain does something quite distinct from
a wholesaler and brings a unique transmission mechanism to international trade.
A further ampliﬁcation of the eﬀect of tariﬀs on imports can arise through the chaining
23We model the intermediary’s role explicitly in Section 3.6.
19technology, and in particular, through the interaction between trade liberalization and tech-
nological change. This channel provides a complementary mechanism through which a tariﬀ
reduction can have not only an ampliﬁed eﬀect on imports, but one that increases over time,
consistent with the observation that the relationship between tariﬀ reductions and trade has
become more pronounced over time.
As implied by Results 2 and 3, if δ is very low the chain purchases its input domestically
regardless of τ. As the chain’s technology improves the range of values of τ for which
the chain prefers foreign sourcing increases, and a small reduction in tariﬀ is increasingly
likely to shift the optimal input source from domestic to foreign manufacturers. Thus, the
improvements in Wal-Mart’s chaining technology and gradual reductions in tariﬀs may have
worked together to bring about the large increase in Chinese imports observed in the 1990s.
This technology-dependent tariﬀ threshold can also explain why Wal-Mart is perceived to
import not only more than stand-alone retailers, but also more than many smaller chains.
Once τ falls below τm(δ), further increases in δ increase imports continuously.
While our discussion has focused on the eﬀect of a reduction in tariﬀs, the analysis
applies equally to other cost reductions. An increasing share of international trade has shifted
from ocean shipping, whose costs have been roughly constant since the 1950s, towards air
transport, whose costs have declined sharply since the 1970s (Hummels, 1999). Combined,
these trends imply a decline in average shipping costs, which will have the same eﬀect as a
decline in tariﬀs in our model. The analysis also applies to reductions in production costs.
A decrease in the oﬀshore production cost e α1, for example due to learning-by-doing or cost-
reducing investment in human capital, induces chain expansion, which ampliﬁes its eﬀect on
imports. A decrease in the value of the foreign currency (say, the yuan) which eﬀectively
reduces the dollar value of e α1 would also have the same eﬀect. Many have argued in recent
years that the yuan is undervalued. A revaluation of the yuan would, in our model, amount
to an increase in α1 and would slow imports from China — by increasing their price and
also by reducing the rate of Wal-Mart’s expansion.
203.4 Induced Technical Change
So far, we have treated δ as an exogenous parameter. In reality, however, a retailer has
a choice of technology level. Wal-Mart chose to invest in computers in its early years, in
the “Retail Link” software in the 1980s and 1990s, and more recently in RFID technology.
Other chains, notably Target and Walgreen’s, have made similarly large investments in
their respective chaining technologies, especially in the past decade. We show below that
endogenizing the retailer’s technology level further ampliﬁes the eﬀect of lower trade barriers
on imports.
To capture the retailer’s technology choice, we assume that to achieve a technology level
δ, the retailer must invest an amount I where I(δ) is increasing and convex in δ.24 That is,
where we have previously used δ as a primitive reﬂecting the chain’s advantage over other
retailers, now the function I(·) is the primitive: the retailer can use this investment function
to achieve any level of chaining technology δ ≥ 0. To conserve on notation, we use the
convention that if k = 0 and δ = 0,
c0(k)
δ = 0.
The chain’s maximization problem becomes
max
k,x,θ,δ
π(k,x,θ,δ) = kx(p(x) − (1 − θ)α0 − θα1) − S(kx) −
c(k)
δ
− θF − I(δ)




The retail chain’s choice of δ satisﬁes the condition
δ
2I
0(δ) = c(k), (6)
24Formally, I(0) = 0, I0 > 0, I00 > 0.
21with the other ﬁrst-order conditions unaﬀected. Assume that an interior solution exists;
it is shown graphically in the (k,δ) plane in Figure 6. The thick solid line k∗(δ;τ1) is the
solution, for τ = τ1, to the simultaneous-equation problem (x∗(k),k∗(x)), taking δ as given.
The optimal chain size increases discretely at δm when the chain begins importing the input;
for all other values of δ, k∗(δ) is a smoothly increasing function. The thin curve δ∗(k) is the
solution to Equation (6); it does not depend on either θ (the import decision) or τ directly.
The dotted line k∗(δ;τ2) in Figure 6 shows how k∗(δ) responds to a reduction in tariﬀ.
The technology thresholds for importing, δm, falls when τ falls; and k∗(δ;τ) increases for
all values of δ ≥ δm. As in the earlier analysis with exogenous δ, a decrease in τ increases
chain size. What is new here is that the eﬀect on k∗ can be decomposed into two parts:
holding δ ﬁxed, there is an increase in k∗(δ), as explained above. In addition, because δ∗
is an increasing function of k a tariﬀ reduction also leads to higher investment in chaining
technology, which indirectly increases k∗ further. In other words, endogenizing the chain’s
technology level adds a fourth component to the eﬀect of lower trade barriers (a reduction
in τ) on total imports.
There is a parallel between this eﬀect and the result of “directed technical change”
in recent models of endogenous technological change (see Acemoglu, 2002). Imports are an
input of the chain retailer; as this input becomes cheaper the chain has an incentive to invest
in technology that takes advantage of the cheaper input. In our context the technology takes
the form of improvements in the organization and logistics of the chain, which complements
the increasingly-abundant cheap imports.
3.5 Product Cycle
In this section we generalize our model by adding many potential production locations in
order to analyze the relationship among trade policy, chain size, and the product cycle. We
show that the product cycle — the migration of sourcing from one country to the next —
22is accelerated by the existence of the chain and adds another layer to the eﬀect of a tariﬀ
reduction on import volume.25
Assume a continuum of possible production locations parameterized by its input cost
α (inclusive of tariﬀ) and let F(α) be the lowest possible ﬁxed cost of importing from a
location with marginal cost α. We assume that F is decreasing in α and that the domestic
location is the only one where F = 0.26
The retail chain chooses the production location to maximize proﬁt. We write the
optimization problem as follows:
max
α G(α,δ) − F(α)
where G(·,·) is deﬁned in Equation (4) and the discrete variable θ is replaced by a continuous
choice represented by α.
The function F(α) is shown as the thick curve in Figure 7. We can also represent G(α;δ)
in Figure 7. By construction, G(α0,δ) ≡ 0 for all values of δ. By the envelope theorem,
∂G
∂α < 0 and ∂G
∂δ > 0 for interior solutions when α < α0, so G(α,δ) is downward-sloping and
becomes steeper, rotating clockwise about the point (α0,0), as δ increases.
In Figure 7 we show the curves G(α,δ) for three diﬀerent values of δ, with δ1 < δ2 < δ3.
The optimal choice of α for each value of δ (which is again treated as exogenous) is the
point at which the vertical gap between the curves G(α,δ) and F(α) is maximized. For low
values of δ, such as δ = δ1, the optimum is point A: domestic production. When δ reaches
a suﬃciently high level, the retailer begins to source the good from a foreign location; at
δ = δ2, the retailer purchases input from the location denoted by point B. As the chaining
technology improves further (δ = δ3), sourcing moves to another location denoted by point
25The product cycle usually refers to the process starting from a good’s introduction in an industrialized
country to the migration of its production, ﬁrst to other industrialized countries and eventually to developing
countries. Our context is one where the good is mature and so the product cycle here refers to the migration
of production from one developing country to another.
26Formally, F(α0) = 0,F0 < 0,F00 > 0,limα→0 F(α) = ∞.
23C. Gereﬃ (1999) counts three major shifts of oﬀshore apparel production since the 1950s: to
Japan; to the “Big Three” Asian producers (Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea); and from
the Big Three to China and a few other Southeast Asian countries (including Sri Lanka).
There is also evidence that diﬀerently-sized U.S. retailers import from diﬀerent countries and
regions; see Gereﬃ (1994). In this sense, Wal-Mart’s relationship with Chinese producers is
quantitatively, but not necessarily qualitatively, diﬀerent from the relationships other retailers
have had, and continue to have, with other supplier countries.
We can also use Figure 7 to analyze the eﬀect of a uniform tariﬀ reduction. Suppose that
all locations (except the domestic location) have the same tariﬀ τ and redeﬁne the horizontal
axis of Figure 7 to be e α = α−τ. The eﬀect of a decrease in τ in this setting is similar to an
increase in the chain’s eﬃciency δ. If the chain initially purchased the input from domestic
producers (i.e., starting from point A), a uniform reduction in tariﬀ would have the standard
eﬀect of moving production abroad; but if initial production were in a foreign location, such as
B, a uniform tariﬀ reduction would move the chain’s optimal source to a diﬀerent country,
such as C. A uniform reduction in tariﬀs can therefore hurt some trading partners while
helping others. This result could explain the empirical observation that China’s share of
U.S. imports has increased — and Latin America’s has fallen — despite broadly similar
tariﬀ treatment in the 1980s and 1990s (see, e.g., Moreira, 2007). A high uniform tariﬀ that
applies to all non-domestic producers therefore protects not only domestic manufacturers,
but also incumbent suppliers that are “close” to the domestic market on the F(α) locus.
Also consistent with this view, Table 8 in Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (forthcoming) shows
that the share of imports from low-, lower-middle, and upper-middle income countries has
increased over the period 1993–2000.27
27The movement of industries across countries may be partially mitigated by the importance of physical
distance. Moreira (2007) reports that from 1990–2002, over four per cent of world market share in manufac-
turing were lost to China from Brazil, the MERCOSUR countries, and the Andean countries compared to
Mexico’s loss of 0.3%. Manufacturing in the East Asian countries lost 8.1% to China. Evans and Harrigan
(2005) argue that for goods where timeliness matters, physical distance is paramount. They ﬁnd that, from
1990–98, imports of “more-often-replenished” apparel goods to the U.S. grew more quickly for proximate
24Thus, a uniform reduction in tariﬀ for all trading partners increases the chain’s market
size and moves the optimal input source to a country with lower unit costs, further increasing
proﬁt per store and inducing an additional increase in the size of the chain and sales per
store. Endogenizing the chain’s technology parameter δ in the presence of many potential
production locations adds yet another eﬀect of a tariﬀ reduction on import volume. As in
the previous section, a reduction in the tariﬀ τ increases the chain’s optimal choice of δ.
This, in turn, rotates the curve G(α,δ) clockwise, moving the optimal source of input to a
“farther” country — in other words, lowering the unit production cost e α, which increases
both the size of the chain and its sales per store.
This interaction between the level of tariﬀ, τ, and the cost of production, e α, can have
numerically large eﬀects. With tariﬀs at the 5–10% range, a 1% reduction in tariﬀ causes
only a 0.05-0.1% in the total input cost. But if it lowers production cost even modestly, the
overall eﬀect on total input cost can be much larger because production cost accounts for the
lion’s share of the input cost. This channel, which we call the product-cycle (or sourcing)
channel, becomes increasingly important as tariﬀs fall.
3.6 Indirect Imports
An assumption we have maintained so far is that the retailer makes the import decision and
contracts directly with a low-cost overseas supplier. A direct, but unappealing and easily
invalidated, implication of this assumption is that non-chain retailers do not sell any imported
goods. The alternative speciﬁcation described in this section allows for the presence of an
intermediary importer or merchandising ﬁrm, which purchases the product from producers
in the foreign location (incurring a cost F to do so) and sells it to any demanding retailer
at a markup.
Several aspects of the legal and institutional arrangements matter here. First, we as-
countries like Mexico than far-away countries like China, implying that for some industries, the importance
of physical distance may dominate the eﬀect discussed in this section.
25sume that the intermediary can price discriminate among diﬀerent retailers. This greatly
simpliﬁes the problem, because we can focus on the price the intermediary charges the chain
retailer independently of the prices it charges other retailers, allowing us to continue to ab-
stract from the structure of the rest of the market. This assumption could not hold if the
intermediary were bound by the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, which forbids price discrim-
ination “between diﬀerent purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality [...] where
the eﬀect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce.” The Act allows for prices to vary with the “grade or
quality” of the product, however, so we are implicitly assuming that the product is easily
modiﬁable in ways that make the Act’s provisions non-binding. Small household appliances,
such as coﬀee makers and toaster ovens, are ready examples of products with a large array
of easily adjustable features.
A second important assumption we make is that the intermediary possesses all the
market power and can charge the retail chain its reservation price. In terms of timing, this
is equivalent to assuming that the intermediary sets prices ﬁrst and the retailer can buy
as much (or as little) from it as it wants at the announced price. Importantly, we assume
that the retail chain chooses x and k after it observes the intermediary’s price, and the
intermediary anticipates this choice.28
Finally, we assume that the retail chain also has the option of importing directly by
duplicating the ﬁxed cost F. This determines the outside option of the chain, which we
assume is binding for the intermediary. The markup the intermediary charges the retail
chain, denoted m, is therefore determined by the identity
π
∗(α1 + m,0,δ) ≡ π
∗(α1,F,δ) (7)
28An alternative in which bargaining power is shared between the two players generates the same qualitative
results as the case we consider.
26where, as before π∗(α,F,δ) is optimized proﬁt given parameters (α,F,δ).
The following result establishes some properties of the intermediary’s markup.
Result 4 (Intermediary’s Markup). The intermediary’s markup satisﬁes:
1. m > 0;
2. For δ ≥ δm, m is decreasing in δ;
3. For τ ≤ τm, m is increasing in τ.
Part 1 of Result 4 is due to the fact that by saving the retailer the ﬁxed investment, F, the
intermediary can charge the retailer a higher price while holding its proﬁt constant. While
the chain’s proﬁt is the same under both direct and indirect imports (by the assumptions that
the intermediary possesses all the market power and that the price constraint is binding),
the fact that marginal cost is diﬀerent under direct and indirect importing implies that the
retailer’s size and prices will not be the same. Speciﬁcally, direct imports would result in a
larger retail chain and lower consumer prices.
The intuition for Part 2 of Result 4 is that an exogenous increase in δ increases the proﬁt
the chain can earn from direct imports. To stay indiﬀerent between direct and indirect
imports the chain’s proﬁt from indirect imports must also increase. This is achieved by
lowering the markup charged by the intermediary.
This result is consistent with anecdotal evidence that the price Wal-Mart pays suppliers
has fallen as the chain has grown and is lower than the price other buyers pay. Fishman
(2006), for example, cites claims by manufacturers of “consistent, irresistible requests” for
annual price cuts (p. 77). In our view, what makes the requests “irresistible” is the fact that
the intermediary makes a larger proﬁt by acquiescing than it would by refusing — because
to refuse is to induce the chain to start importing directly. Such a switch by the chain would
reduce the intermediary’s proﬁt for two reasons. First, it would lose the markup it could
have earned on all sales to the chain. Second, because the chain would expand if it were
27to face a marginal cost of α1 instead of α1 + m, the number of other retailers to which the
intermediary could sell would fall as well. This result is also consistent with a study reported
by Riper (2007) ﬁnding that suppliers’ gross margins are inversely related to the fraction of
their output sold to Wal-Mart and that very few companies that earn at least 10% of their
revenue from Wal-Mart achieve their sector’s average gross margin.
The intuition for Part 3 of Result 4 is that a reduction in tariﬀ that increases the prof-
itability of direct imports would lead the chain to expand if it imported directly, increasing
its proﬁt above and beyond the increase that would come from the cost reduction alone. To
keep the chain from exercising this option, the intermediary must oﬀer the chain lower price
that similarly increases its proﬁt.
This result implies that tariﬀ reductions can aﬀect yet another wedge, that of the dou-
ble marginalization. In the presence of a monopolist intermediary, a tariﬀ reduction that
increases the proﬁtability of direct imports forces the intermediary to lower the markup it
charges the chain, further amplifying the eﬀect of trade liberalization on the chain’s imports.
Since the price the chain faces, and consequently also the price that it sets for consumers, is
lower than the price of other retailers, the expansion of the chain increases imports even if
small retailers are also selling imported goods.
This discussion has sidestepped the more complicated problem that the intermediary
would face if the Robinson-Patman provisions were binding. In that case we could not solve
for the price the intermediary charges one retailer separately from the price it charges other
retailers. In the extreme case, it may have to supply a large chain retailer and many single-
store retailers at the same price. This scenario is interesting because it could explain some
of the dynamics we observe in the retail sector. As long as the price constraint imposed by
the chain retailer is not too low — that is, as long as δ is not too high — the intermediary
may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to sell to both constituencies at a markup m. Once δ increases beyond
some threshold, however, the intermediary may prefer to set a higher price, increasing the
markup it receives from small retailers, despite the fact that this would mean losing the
28chain as a customer.
4 Numerical Exercise
Our model identiﬁes three main channels through which exogenous changes such as tariﬀ
reductions and technology improvements aﬀect the size of the chain retailer. In this section,
we compare these three eﬀects — the demand eﬀect, expansion eﬀect, and scale eﬀect —
quantitatively. The exercise is constrained by the limits of the data but the calculations al-
low us to use the model to (1) assess the importance of scale economies of the retail chain in
amplifying eﬀects from exogenous shocks, (2) derive a nonlinear relationship between input
cost and the sales volume of the chain, and (3) decompose the growth of Wal-Mart from
1984 to 2004 into that which is attributable to technology improvements and that which
is attributable to reductions in trade barriers and resultant changes in product sourcing.
We ﬁnd that the demand eﬀect accounts for approximately 43% of the full eﬀect of a tariﬀ
reduction on sales volume; chain scale economies and increase in the number of stores ac-
count for the remaining 57%. Increases in the eﬃciency of Wal-Mart’s chaining technology
account for approximately 60% of the increase in sales volume. The remaining changes are
due to decreases in input cost which include exogenous reductions in tariﬀ and endogenous
reductions due to changes in sourcing choices and intermediary markups.
4.1 Method and Parameter Estimates
For this numerical exercise, we use the following functional forms:
p(x) = Ax
− 1








σ, s > 0,σ ∈ (0,1). (10)
















ε − α − sσ(kx)
σ−1 = 0, (12)
where α here denotes the marginal input cost, inclusive of transportation cost and tariﬀ
(applicable if the good is imported).
To obtain numerical values for the parameters in the model, we use information from
Wal-Mart’s 1995 Annual Report. Wal-Mart’s ﬁscal year ends January 31, so the 1995 annual
report contains information most relevant to the calendar year 1994. All dollar values are in
1994 dollars unless stated otherwise. We normalize α to one in 1994 and set the marketing
economies-of-scale parameter σ = 0.8 (we report some results for diﬀerent values of σ). The
number of Wal-Mart stores, k, and revenue per store, p·x (calculated as total revenue divided
by number of stores) are 2,833 and $29,115,425, respectively.
Wal-Mart also reports an expenditure of $12,858 million on “operating, sales, and general
administration” (OSGA), which we interpret as its chaining cost; using Equation (9) we can
infer δ. Combining this value with the relationship ε =
pxδ
k (derived from the two ﬁrst-order
conditions) allows us to compute ε.
Wal-Mart reports its “cost of sales” to be $65,586 million, which we interpret as the sum
of input cost and marketing cost. Combining this accounting relationship and Equation (12)
allows us to solve simultaneously for kx and s. We divide kx by k to solve for x and combine
with the known value px to solve for p. We then use the demand equation, Equation (8), to
solve for A. Table 3 summarizes our parameters calculated from the 1994 data.
We calculate the demand elasticity, ε, to be 3.2. This number is broadly consistent with
estimated price elasticities for various food categories at Dominick’s Finer Foods grocery
stores reported by Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003), which ranged from 1.2 to 5.7, with
a median of 2.2, and with an estimate by Chiou (2005) putting the price elasticity of demand
30for DVDs at Wal-Mart around 2. We expect the aggregate price elasticity of demand to be
higher than elasticities of demand for speciﬁc categories of goods in the presence of demand
for “one-stop shopping”: a reduction in the price of one good generates additional demand
for other goods sold at the store by increasing the number of people who shop there (see
Basker, Klimek, and Van, 2008, for a discussion on the relationship between retail chain size
and scope).
4.2 Quantitative Elasticity Decomposition
In our model, the expansion of the retail chain and the chain’s scale economies augment
the conventional demand price response to shocks such as a reduction in tariﬀ. Using the
parameters we estimated above, we can quantify these three eﬀects: the demand eﬀect,
expansion eﬀect, and scale eﬀect — through which tariﬀ reductions aﬀect Wal-Mart’s sales
volume. We quantify these three eﬀects as elasticities as shown in equation (5) by implicitly
diﬀerentiating Equations (11) and (12). We evaluate these quantities using 1994 values of
relevant variables. For τ, we use a speciﬁc tariﬀ + transport cost of τ = 0.0967.29
We report these results in Table 4. For σ = 0.8, the elasticity of imports with respect to
tariﬀ is approximately −5; that is, a 1% reduction in tariﬀ causes a 5% increase in import
volume. Of this amount, approximately 43%, or −2.2, is due to the demand eﬀect; 25%
(−1.3) is due to the expansion eﬀect, and 32% (−2.1) is due to the scale eﬀect. For lower
values of σ, stronger scale economies for the chain, the higher is the total tariﬀ elasticity
of imports.30 But while the absolute values of the three eﬀects depend on the choice of σ,
29Hummels (1999) estimates transportation cost in 1995 at 4.37% of the value of goods. For the relevant ad-
valorem tariﬀ rate, we use the average (unweighted) tariﬀ rate charged by the U.S. to Normal Trade Relations
countries in 1994 from the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), averaged over all products with
the exception of live animals, fresh produce, nuclear reactors, aircraft, railroad cars, and vessels and parts,
from http://reportweb.usitc.gov/tariff/tariff form .jsp, which is approximately 6.33%. The sum
of the two is 10.7%. Given the normalization α1 = e α1 + τ = 1, this implies that τ = 0.0967.
30As σ approaches 0.87, a singularity problem increases s and reduces all three eﬀects sharply towards
zero.
31the demand eﬀect’s share of the total elasticity is quite stable around 43–45%. Thus, the
existence of the chain more than doubles the eﬀect of a tariﬀ reduction on import volume.
4.3 Changes over Time
A combination of tariﬀ reductions, sourcing changes, and possibly markup reductions has
reduced the marginal input cost, α, over time. Our model predicts a non-linear relationship
between α and the size of the retail chain. This nonlinear relationship is shown in Figure
8, which plots the results of numerical simulations that hold δ ﬁxed at the 1994 value and
allow α to vary between the values 0.7 and 1.3. Small decreases in the marginal input cost,
α, have a much larger impact on total output when α is small than when it is large.
We next calculate the empirical reduction in α between 1984 and 2004. To do this, we
calculate δt for t = 1984 and 2004 from the relationship (derived from ﬁrst-order conditions)
δt = ε·kt
pt·xt where (pt · xt) and kt are actual revenue per store (in 1994 dollars) and number of
stores, respectively, in year t, and ε = 3.2075 is the elasticity derived above. This formula
implies that δ1984 = 0.000201 and δ2004 = 0.000401; by way of comparison, the 1994 value
of δ was 0.000312.31 We derive xt and pt from actual value of pt · xt (converted to 1994
dollars) using the demand equation. Finally, we calculate αt as the value of α for which the
ﬁrst-order condition for k, Equation (11), is satisﬁed.
These calculations are summarized in Table 5. The cost of input (inclusive of relevant
tariﬀs and transportation cost, as well as intermediary markup), α, fell by 23% of the period
1984–2004 (from 1.176 to 0.930), with most of the decline occurring in the ﬁrst half of the
period (recall that the 1994 value of α is normalized to 1).
According to this calculation, the real price charged to consumers, p, fell by 57% over
this 20-year period. As a comparison, while the CPI for all items rose 66% during this time,
the CPI for clocks, lamps, and decorative items rose by only 11%, a 55% drop in real terms.
31If we derived δt from Wal-Mart’s reports of OSGA expenses for these years instead, we would have
gotten δ1984 = 0.000169 and δ2004 = 0.000473.
32Real apparel prices fell by 82%, the price of household furnishings fell by 86%, the price of
furniture and bedding by 88%, and the price of toys by 47%.
To get a sense of the relative contributions of the decline in α and the rise in δ to the
























kx is approximated using the log change in (kx) from 1984 to 2004 and similarly
for the other variables (α and δ). We do not distinguish here between reductions in the cost
of production e α and reductions in the tariﬀ (or transportation cost) τ, for several reasons.
First, at the beginning of the period (before Wal-Mart’s launch of the “Buy American”
campaign) Wal-Mart’s imports were probably minimal; only after tariﬀ rates fell below some
threshold level, τm, did the tariﬀ rate become meaningful (Result 3). Moreover, at τ = τm the
increase in (kx) is discrete, due to a decrease in e α, the cost of production, when the retailer
switches from domestic to foreign sourcing. Even after switching to foreign production, α may
decrease more than one-for-one with tariﬀ reductions as the optimal location of production
moves, and/or as the markup, m, charged by an intermediary decreases. Available data do
not allow us to distinguish between these channels, and we do not have estimates of transport
cost for years other than 1995.
The decomposition is reported in the last row of Table 6. The increase in δ over this
period accounts for approximately 59% of the total increase in kx, and the decrease in α
accounts for 41% of this increase.32
As above, we can further decompose each term into a demand channel, an expansion
32As an alternative approach, we performed a counterfactual exercise in which we held α constant at 1
and let δ change from its 1984 level to its 2004 level. This exercise generated 59.4% of the actual increase in
(kx) over this period, consistent with this conclusion.

























































































The ﬁrst three rows of Table 6 report the relative contribution of each eﬀect (elasticities
are evaluated at their 1994 levels). The demand eﬀect, which comes entirely from decreases
in α, explains 17.6% of the total increase in (kx) over this period. The eﬀects introduced by
the retail chain account for the remaining 82.4% of the increase in (kx) with the expansion
eﬀect contributing 45.5% and the scale eﬀect 36.8%.
5 Concluding Remarks
Our goal in this paper has been to suggest a link between recent trends in the U.S. retail sector
and trends in imports of consumer goods to the U.S. We show that the interaction between
scale economies in the retail sector and scale economies in the import process generates a
two-way relationship between import volume and chain size; this interaction has implications
for trade volume and the sensitivity of imports to tariﬀ reductions. Technological innovations
in the retail sector increase chain size and, by increasing market size, also increase imports.
Likewise, reductions in the cost of merchandise (due, for example, to tariﬀ reductions or
foreign currency devaluations) increase both imports and the size of the dominant retailer.
When the retailer’s level of investment in the chaining technology is endogenized, we obtain
a result akin to “directed technical change” in that the retailer’s investment in chaining
technology increases as imports become cheaper and more abundant.
Many observers (e.g., McKinsey Global Institute, 2001) have noted the retail sector’s
high productivity growth rate in the 1990s and cite Wal-Mart as an important source of
34this productivity increase. Calculations based on our model suggest that about 60% of
Wal-Mart’s growth from 1984–2004 is directly attributable to technology advances. The
remaining 40% comes from reductions in input cost, including include tariﬀ reductions as well
sourcing from lower cost producers. It is likely that all these cost saving factors contribute
to the observed productivity growth in retail and Wal-Mart in particular.
While our discussion has centered on the eﬀect of a decline in tariﬀs on chain size and
import volume, the feedback eﬀect the chain exerts on imports is also present when foreign
production costs fall. Any decline in the cost of production in China, for example due to
investment in human or physical capital, relaxation of regulation, or learning, increases the
optimal size of the retail chain and so increases imports not only through the direct demand
eﬀect but also by expanding the chain and its level of investment in “chaining” technology.
Our model abstracts from competition between chains to highlight the eﬀect of increasing
returns on imports, input cost, and technology adoption for a single chain. We hope future
research will examine the extent to which the partial-equilibrium implications of our analysis
carry through to a setting with endogenous market structure and the interaction between
the present complementarities and strategic considerations. If markets are contestable, retail
prices will be driven down, reducing the marginal return to an additional store.33 At the
same time, the return to lower costs that come with an expanded chain — due to returns
to scale and cheaper sourcing — may be higher if the retailer can thereby “shake oﬀ” the
competition. The resulting equilibrium may have a number of small, symmetric, chains, or,
in the spirit of Bagwell, Ramey, and Spulber (1997), an asymmetric distribution in which
one chain makes a larger investment in size and dominates the market.
The implications of our model extend to a situation with many goods or industries.
Suppose that the chain retailer sells many goods, which vary with respect to the gap in
unit production costs between domestic and foreign manufacturers. This variable gap may
33In an earlier version of this paper, Basker and Van (2006), we allowed for contestable markets, but
potential entrants were stand-alone stores with relatively high cost.
35reﬂect diﬀerent degrees of “maturity” of the goods. When the chain is small, only goods
for which the gap in unit production cost is suﬃciently large are produced oﬀshore, with
the remaining goods produced domestically. As the chain expands — e.g., in response to
trade liberalization — more and more products are sourced oﬀshore. The oﬀshoring of each
good creates a “wake” as it leads the chain to expand and increases the beneﬁt of oﬀshoring
additional goods. This interpretation allows reductions in the tariﬀ, τ, to aﬀect unit input
cost, α, continuously even if there is just one foreign production location. It is also consistent
with the observation by Ruhl (2008) that the response of the extensive margin to a tariﬀ
reduction can be much larger than response of the intensive margin. The importance of the
extensive margin is also underscored by Bernard, Jensen, and Schott’s (forthcoming) ﬁnding
that ﬁrms that import multiple unique products employ more workers than ﬁrms that import
just one product and import more (in dollar terms) per worker. In this framework as well,
the pace of oﬀshoring is directly related to the response of chain size to trade liberalization,
which, as before, depends on the chain’s technology.
In conclusion, we note that our model highlights a mechanism not usually mentioned in
popular discourse. There is a common perception that Wal-Mart and trade with China are
related. But the discussion of the relationship between Wal-Mart’s growth and import growth
tends to focus on Wal-Mart’s monopsony power implied in the often-made claim that Wal-
Mart “forces” suppliers to move production overseas in order to cut costs. In a model with
increasing marginal cost, a monopsonist who cannot price-discriminate depresses production
to extract a lower input price. Such a model counter-intuitively implies that in the absence
of Wal-Mart and other large chains, imports would have grown at a rate even faster than
the one we have observed over the past two decades. While we do not deny the importance
of issues arising from Wal-Mart’s market power beyond its role as seller, discussions of such
issues are taking place without the beneﬁt of formal analysis. Our model is a starting point
from which to bring economic analysis into the debate surrounding Wal-Mart’s role in an
increasingly-globalized setting.
36A Proofs
Existence of Equilibrium. Assume that only domestic production is possible. The chain
retailer solves the following problem
max
k,x
π(k,x) = kx(p(x) − α) − S(kx) −
c(k)
δ
subject to k ∈ [0,N]
x ≥ 0
where
As noted in the text (Section 3.1), the corner solution (k,x) = (0,0) guarantees zero
proﬁt for all δ > 0. If an interior solution (k∗,x∗) exists, it must satisfy the ﬁrst-order
conditions






0(x)x + p(x) − α − S
0(kx)) = 0, (17)
along with second-order conditions. Graphically, this solution is the intersection of x∗(k)
and k∗(x) in Figure 4.




































37One way to interpret these conditions is as a set of restrictions on the magnitude of S00(·),
or the degree of increasing-returns in the chain’s marketing technology. The marketing
component of marginal cost, S0(kx), falls when either k or x increases; an interior optimum
can only exist if it does not fall too rapidly. Equation (18) bounds the extent of increasing
returns due to increasing x relative to the decline in marginal revenue from increasing x,
holding k constant. Equation (19) bounds the extent of increasing returns due to increasing
k (now holding x constant) relative to the increased chaining cost entailed in increasing k.
Equation (20) bounds the extent of increasing returns when x and k are allowed to co-vary.
Since x and k move together (see below), for some functional-form assumptions this condition
is suﬃcient and implies the previous two.
An interior intersection of k∗(x) and x∗(k) occurs if:











To see that the ﬁrst condition is satisﬁed, from Equation (17), note that for k = 0, x∗ is
undeﬁned but nonnegative; and from Equation (16), for x = 0, k∗ = 0. For the second













The denominator of Equation (21) is positive by second-order condition (19). For x < x∗(k),
πx > 0 so the numerator is also positive and
dk∗(x)
dx > 0. For x > x∗(k), πx < 0, but
in the neighborhood of x∗, πx is not too negative, so the numerator remains positive. As
x increases beyond some level, πx becomes suﬃciently negative that
dk∗(x)
dx turns negative.
38By the second-order condition (18) and concavity of S(·), both the numerator and the
denominator of Equation (22) are negative, so
dx∗(k)
dk > 0.
The third condition, 1
dk∗(x)/dx >
dx∗(k)























The term on the left-hand side is positive by second-order condition (20). The right-hand
side is negative for x < x∗(k), equals zero at x = x∗(k) and turns positive for x > x∗(k). As
above, in the neighborhood of x∗ the RHS term is not too positive, so the inequality holds.
The proof of existence of equilibrium when foreign sourcing is allowed follows analo-
gously.
Proof of Lemma 1. Deﬁne Γθ(k) to be the marginal beneﬁt of expanding the chain condi-
tional on an input source θ ∈ {0,1} and choosing the optimal number of units to sell in each




















An interior solution k∗
θ — denoting the optimal chain size conditional on the input source
— equates Γθ(k) with the marginal cost of expanding the chain,
c0(k)
δ . Since the marginal
cost of chain expansion is increasing in k, for interior solutions it is suﬃcient to show that
Γ1(k) > Γ0(k).
By the envelope theorem, dπ
dα = dΓ
dα = −x∗
θ(k). Since the ﬁrst-order condition (3) implies
39that x∗
1(k) > x∗
0(k) in the unconstrained optimization problem, Γ1(k) > Γ0(k), and k∗
1 > k∗
0
for all interior k∗
0.
Finally, since k∗
1 > 1 for all x > 0, but k∗
0 = 1 for x ≤ xs, and since x∗(k) > 0 regardless
of θ, whenever k∗
0 = 1 then k∗
1 > 1. Also, since N is the upper bound for chain size, whenever
k∗
0 = N then k∗
1 = N.
Proof of Result 2. To conserve on notation, we write G(δ) taking α1 as a constant. We need
to show that there is some value δm < ∞ such that F > G(δ) for δ < δm and F < G(δ) for
δ > δm.
For values of δ such that k∗





δ2 > 0 (by the envelope theorem
and Lemma 1), so the beneﬁt of importing increases with the ﬁrm’s technology parameter
(for interior values of k). Also, for values of δ such that k∗
1(δ) = N but k∗














dδ > 0). For values of δ such that k∗
0(δ) = k∗
1(δ) = N, dG
dδ = 0. Deﬁne
δN ≡ min{δ : k
∗
0(δ) = N}.
Since δm is deﬁned by G(δm) = F, such a threshold exists if F < G(δN).
Proof of Results 3.1 and 3.2. We need to show that there is some value τm < ∞ such that
F > G(e α1 + τ,δ) for τ > τm and F < G(e α1 + τ,δ) for τ < τm.
By construction, G(e α1 +τ,δ) is positive whenever τ < α0 − e α1, which holds by assump-
tion; and limτ→(α0−e α1) G(e α1 + τ,δ) = 0. By the envelope theorem,








so as τ decreases, G gets larger, reaching a maximum (for a given δ) at τ = 0.
40Deﬁne τm by G(e α1 + τm,δ) ≡ F. For F < G(e α1 + 0,δ), there exists τm ∈ (0,α0 − e α1)
such that G(δ, e α1 + τ) < F if and only if τ > τm.







Since the numerator is positive (see Result 2.1) and the denominator is negative, dτm
dδ > 0.
Proof of Results 1 and 3.3. When production has moved oﬀshore, we replace α with ˜ α1 + τ
and write the ﬁrst order conditions as:
πx = k(p
0(x)x + p(x) − (e α1 + τ) − S
0(kx)) = 0




















































which we solve using Cramer’s Rule to obtain:


















































δ2 k(p00(x)x + 2p0(x) − kS00(kx))





41where |H| is the determinant of the Hessian matrix,






















At the optimum, this expression simpliﬁes since p0(x)x + p(x) − (e α1 + τ) − S0(kx) = 0.
By the second-order condition, |H| > 0, so dk∗
dτ < 0, dx∗
dτ < 0 and dk∗
dδ > 0, dx∗
dδ > 0.
Therefore, total import volume increases with δ and falls with τ:
d(k∗x∗)
dτ < 0 and
d(k∗x∗)
dδ > 0.
Import value also moves in the same direction:
d(k∗x∗p(x∗))
dτ





= k∗(p(x∗) + x∗p0(x∗))dx∗
dδ + x∗p(x∗)dk∗
dδ > 0.
Proof of Result 4. Part 1 follows from applications of the envelope theorem to Equation 7,
to obtain dπ∗
dα < 0 and dπ∗
dF < 0.
Part 2 follows from diﬀerentiating both sides of Equation (7) with respect to δ, applying





c(k∗(α1 + m)) − c(k∗(α1))
δ2 · k∗(α1 + m) · x∗(α1 + m)

< 0
The numerator is positive because m > 0 and (from Lemma 1) k∗ is decreasing in α.
Finally, diﬀerentiating both sides of Equation (7) with respect to α1, applying the en-




k∗(α1) · x∗(α1) − k∗(α1 + m) · x∗(α1 + m)
k∗(α1 + m) · x∗(α1 + m)
> 0
42since m > 0 and (again from Lemma 1) both k∗ and x∗ are decreasing in α.
B Data Appendix
We use BLS price indices for the years 1984–2003 to compute apparel CPI inﬂation in 23 geo-
graphic markets (MSAs) (denoted ∆pit) as the year-to-year log change in each MSA’s apparel
CPI. The BLS price indices can be obtained from the BLS web site, http://www.bls.gov/cpi/.
The MSAs used in the analysis are: Anchorage; Atlanta; Boston-Brockton-Nashua; Chicago-
Gary-Kenosha; Cincinnati-Hamilton; Cleveland-Akron; Dallas-Fort Worth; Denver-Boulder-
Greeley; Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint; Honolulu; Houston-Galveston-Brazoria; Kansas City; Los
Angeles-Riverside-Orange County; Miami-Fort Lauderdale; Milwaukee-Racine; Minneapolis-
St. Paul; Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City; Pittsburgh; Portland-Salem; St. Louis;
San Diego; San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose; Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton.34
We also compute Wal-Mart’s market share in each MSA each year, denoted WMshareit,
as the ratio of the number of existing Wal-Mart stores in the MSA to the number of all retail
establishments specializing in apparel or “general merchandise” sales. The relevant number
of retail establishments is computed by adding up the number of establishments across all
counties within each MSA for SIC codes 5300 (general merchandise) and 5600 (apparel) for
1985–1997, and for NAICS codes 452 and 448 thereafter, from County Business Patterns.35
The number of existing Wal-Mart stores in each MSA each year come from available
historical lists of Wal-Mart store locations. For 1985–1993 we use the annual publication
Directory of Discount Stores published by Chain Store Guides; for 1994–2003 we use the
34The results are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of the New York-Northern New Jersey-Long
Island MSA, which had no Wal-Mart stores throughout the period.
35Despite the shift from SIC to NAICS after 1997, we ﬁnd no break in the numbers of estab-
lishments before and after this shift, suggesting that the mapping from SIC to NAICS is fairly
straightforward for these two classiﬁcations. County Business Patterns data can be obtained from
http://www.census.gov/epcd/cbp/view/cbpview.html.
43Wal-Mart editions of the road atlas published by Rand McNally, which contain complete
store lists (see Basker (2005a,b) for details on the data set construction). We supplement
these lists with data from press releases, available on Wal-Mart’s web site, about more recent
store openings.36 37
Finally, we obtain the apparel import price index from the BLS web site, http://www.bls.gov/mxp/.
We use the import price index for Standard International Trade Classiﬁcation (SITC) code
84 and for end-use classiﬁcation code 400. We compute the import inﬂation rate (denoted
∆pm
t ) for both indices using December-to-December log changes in the value of the index.
36The press releases are available from http://www.walmartstores.com/wmstore/wmstores/HomePage.jsp.
Special care needs to be taken using them, however, since new openings, store renovations, and conversions
of “discount stores” to “supercenters” are often not distinguished in the releases. To circumvent this
problem we match all press release data against the list of existing stores to ensure that we do not double
count stores.
37Results are virtually identical if error-free administrative data from Basker (2006) are used instead.
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49Table 1. Growth of Retail Chains, 1948–1997a
Large Chains’ Share
Chains’ Share of All of All Chains’
Firms Stores Sales Firms Stores Sales
1948 9.2% 29.6% 27.2% 41.6%
1954 9.7% 30.1% 26.5% 41.8%
1958 10.2% 33.7% 27.5% 42.4%
1963 2.85% 12.9% 36.6% 0.44% 31.8% 43.2%
1967 2.16% 12.5% 39.8% 0.60% 37.6% 46.7%
1972 2.62% 15.2% 45.2% 0.68% 40.2% 55.8%
1982 3.24% 20.9% 52.3% 0.74% 45.5% 56.5%
1992 4.95% 33.6% 58.2% 1.02% 51.5% 58.8%
1997b 5.12% 37.5% 61.2% 1.32% 56.6% 61.0%
2002b 4.33% 37.6% 62.8% 1.45% 61.8% 68.4%
Source: authors’ calculations from Census of Business
(various years) and Census of Retail Trade (various years)
a Chains include multi-unit retailers with more than one
unit; large chains include chains with 101+ stores for
1948–1972, 100+ stores in 1982–1997
b Classiﬁcation by SIC 1948–1992, NAICS thereafter.
Table 2. Regression Results for Consumer Price Inﬂation
SITC Import Inﬂation End-Use Import Inﬂation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆P m
t
0.4331 0.3036 0.5123 0.3657
(0.0722)*** (0.0848)*** (0.0687)*** (0.0835)***
(0.0439)*** (0.0505)*** (0.0423)*** (0.0502)***












Observations 437 437 437 437
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, respectively: unclustered, clustered by MSA,
clustered by year. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
50Table 3. Parameter and Variable Estimates
Time Invariant Time Varying (1994)
A 535.82 α 1
ε 3.2075 p 3.837
σ 0.8 x 7,588 · 103
s 239.03 δ 0.000312
Table 4. Tariﬀ Elasticity of Sales, 1994
Demand Expansion Scale Total Demand Share
σ Eﬀect Eﬀect Eﬀect Elasticity of Total
0.7 -3.478 -2.051 -2.197 -7.727 45%
0.75 -3.030 -1.758 -2.097 -6.885 44%
0.8 -2.237 -1.276 -1.691 -5.204 43%
0.85 -0.738 -0.413 -0.607 -1.759 42%
Table 5. Time-Varying Parameters and Variables, 1984–2004
Variable 1984 2004 Log Change
x 2,113 · 103 13,060 · 103 +1.82
k 756 5289 +1.95
p 5.717 3.240 −0.57
α 1.176 0.930 −0.23
δ 0.000201 0.000401 +0.69
Table 6. Relative Contributions, by Variable and Channel,
to Wal-Mart’s Expansion, 1984–2004
α δ Row Sum
Demand Channel 0.1764 0 0.1764
Expansion Channel 0.1005 0.3547 0.4553
Scale Channel 0.1333 0.2351 0.3684
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Figure 2. Wal-Mart’s Growth: Stores and Average Sales per Store, 1985–2005
52Figure 3. Determination of x∗(k)
Figure 4. Equilibrium Chain Size and Quantity as Functions of δ
53Figure 5. Equilibrium Chain Size and Quantity: Domestic vs. Foreign Production
Figure 6. Endogenous Chaining Technology
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Figure 8. Simulated Sales Volume as a Function of Input Cost, 1994
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